Adjustment of issue positions based on network strategies in an election campaign: a twomode network autoregression model with cross-nested random effects Kleinnijenhuis, J.; de Nooy, W. 
Introduction
During election campaigns, politicians debate salient political issues in the media. They take different stances, pro or con on a variety of issues; some stronger than others. It is straightforward to conceptualize issue positions as a valued two-mode network of parties by issues. This, however, is hardly ever done because political campaigning research usually focuses on comparisons of complete election campaigns, either in time or across countries, for example on the basis of media coverage (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Kriesi, et al., 2006) , expert surveys (Laver & Hunt, 1992) , or party manifestoes (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001 ). The variety of positions taken by parties on idiosyncratic issues in different campaigns is reduced to positions taken on a limited number of issue dimensions such as the left-right dimension (Castles & Mair, 1997 ) and a secondary cultural dimension (Kriesi, et al., 2006) by means of common sense or by means of multivariate analysis techniques such as factor analysis (Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987) , weighted multidimensional proximity scaling (Kriesi, et al., 2006) , correspondence analysis (Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999) or even undimensional unfolding (Van Schuur & Kiers, 1994) . With only a few issue dimensions left per election campaign it does not make much sense to apply a two-mode network approach. In majoritarian two-party systems a network approach resembles even more the sledgehammer to crack a nut, since it's fairly trivial that the two parties will attack each other and will disagree with each other's issue positions.
In a non-majoritarian multiparty system, a network approach becomes indispensable, especially when the assumption of stable issue positions is questioned, as we do here. Do parties adjust their issue positions to the positions of other parties during an election campaign? The normative view on representative democracy requires parties to offer voters a choice between distinct sets of clear-cut issue positions spelled out in party manifestoes (Mansbridge, 2003; Miller, 1999) . Shifts in issue positions within an election campaign tend to be perceived as opportunistic and populist appeals of parties to catch a broader share of the de-aligned voters who deviate from a party's former ideological issue positions (Kirchheimer, 1966) . The timely order of shifts in issue positions is irrelevant from this perspective. But is this normative view in accordance with empirical reality? We doubt it and we put it to the test here.
For this test, a network approach is chosen. We conceptualize issue positions as a longitudinal valued two-mode network with day-to-day positions of parties on issues. We take an actor-based approach (Snijders, van der Bunt, & Steglich, 2010) , situating a party in the context of previous issue positions as well as previous reports on criticism or support among parties, predicting the value of the party's subsequent issue position from tendencies towards balance and transitivity.
A joint analysis of the one-mode network of relationships between actors and the twomode network of their issue positions is also central to the literature on advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999 ) and the literature on decision making models (Stokman & Van Oosten, 1995) . The advocacy coalitions literature shows that ally networks consist of actors who share their beliefs but also that actors adapt their secondary beliefs to their core beliefs in order to foster an ally network that may remain stable for a long time (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Weible, 2007; Weible & Sabatier, 2005) . The hypotheses to be tested in this paper concern how actors adapt their beliefs, i.e. their issue positions, to each other and to those of their allies. Our results show that issue positions during election campaigns are fairly volatile rather than stable. The literature on decision models predicts the outcomes of negotiations or issue positions shortly before a joint decision is made (Arregui, Stokman, & Thomson, 2004) on the basis of exogenous initial issue positions and issue saliency, which are estimated by experts. In contrast, we consider daily (changes in) issue positions as endogenous dependent variables.
Towards a two-mode dynamic network adjustment model
We model parties as actors that adjust their relations with one another and their positions on issues to previously established relations and previous issue positions of their peers. In this respect, our model is an actor-based model for network dynamics (Snijders, van der Bunt, & Steglich, 2010) . The essence of our model is that the one-mode network of support and criticism among parties -also known as attack or conflict versus cooperation in the literature -is changing as a function both of the one-mode network itself and of the pattern of issue positions in the two-mode network of parties by issues. Likewise the twomode network of issue positions of parties changes not only as a function of the two-mode network itself, but also as a function of the one-mode network of support and criticism among parties.
In this special issue about two-mode networks we focus on changes in the two-mode network of issue positions of parties.
In other words, we analyze the political influence process resulting in adjusted issue positions rather than on the selection process to obtain political friends and political enemies, but the explanation of changes in issue positions involves both the history of the two-mode network of issue positions and the history of the one-mode network of support and criticism among parties.
Our data are measured in continuous time on a day-by-day basis so we can make a strict distinction between the tie (issue position) to be explained and the network context of previous ties. Thus, we do not use network models that were developed specifically for cross-sectional data, which typically assume that equilibrium has been reached already, such as Exponential Random Graph models (Wasserman & Robins, 2005; Snijders et al., 2006) . Neither do we use a specific longitudinal network model such as SIENA (Snijders, et al., 2010) , which assumes binary or categorical relationships and which simulates the process taking place in between a few non-contiguous measurement waves (typically less than ten).
For a number of reasons a standard econometric model for continuous time series data is preferable as in event dyads research (Brandes, Lerner, & Snijders, 2009) . First, our focus is on the extent to which parties take pro or con stances to issues rather than on ordinal values of positions, and on the precise degree of support or criticism among parties, thus on continuous tie value rather than on the discrete presence or absence of a tie. In addition, our data cover the entire process on a daily basis, resulting in an ordinary time series, instead of snapshots as in a panel design. Third, a major distinction with SIENA-like models, which assume that actors take decisions one after another (Snijders, et al., 2010) , concerns the simultaneous nature of decisions to be made in the political information environment. It's the daily news in the mass media that provides the information environment for politicians, with respect to both new or renewed issue positions of other parties and emerging patterns of support and criticism among parties.
Parties have to react simultaneously to yesterday's news on a daily basis, without knowing how other parties reacted to this news. Their campaign teams usually do so after daily scheduled discussions about the latest news. They have to assume that both the voters and the other parties take into account the party's actions as they are represented in the mass media. Thus, we use media content as the data source both to build up the daily one-mode network of parties by parties and the two-mode network of parties by issues, and we will assume that parties act simultaneously on a daily basis. Note that a day represents the short term in our model.
Definition of networks as matrices `
We distinguish between two types of network context: (1) the two-mode network of media reports on issue positions, and (2) the one-mode network of media reports on support and criticism among political parties. Although media reports are discrete events-a newspaper prints an article containing a statement of a party on an issue on a specific day-we assume that both politicians and voters aggregate the various news statements into a single cognitive map and take into account not just today's statements but also previously reported statements when attributing issue positions to parties. We treat an issue position as an image created from current and previous statements reported in the news media. This also applies to support relations among parties.
A party's position on an issue on a particular day is operationalized as the average of the values of that party's issue positions until that day, weighted by the agenda setting power or saliency of the news on each of the previous days, as measured by the number of statements in the news about the party's issue position. Statements that are published in more news outlets are deemed more important because they are more successful at setting the public agenda (Rogers, Dearing, & Bregman, 1993 Following the ideodynamical news effects model of David Fan (Fan, 1996; Fan & Tims, 1989) , we assume that the force of yesterday's news to impress today's audience decays at an exponential rate. Here we will assume that its power decays with a half-life value of a week.
To arrive at hypotheses with respect to network influences on issue positions the entries of the matrices , , , and have to be defined more precisely.
• is the m × n matrix of the saliency of issue positions of parties at time point t. An entry in matrix refers to the saliency of party i with respect to issue k on a given day t (current day: t = 0) calculated from the number or frequency of news reports on the criticism or support ( ) at a previous day t, wherein this force decays by half after a week (7 days). Saliency at time t is rescaled to a proportion because we divide by the weighted total number of statements on all issues by party i, which is equivalent to taking the relative outdegree. This ensures that the covariates (Eqs. 5, 6, and 7) are weighted averages with values in the value range -1..+1 instead of weighted sums.
Eq. (1), saliency of an issue position:
is the m × n matrix of the pro-con value (quality) of the issue positions of parties at day t (range -1..+1). An entry in matrix refers to the issue position of party i with respect to issue k on a given day t (current day: t = 0) calculated as the reported issue position on a given day ( , range -1..+1), weighted by the number of news items reporting that issue position ( ), in which this weight decays by half after a week (7 days).
Eq. (2) An entry in matrix refers to the saliency of party i with respect to party j on a given day t (current day: t = 0) calculated from the number of news reports on the criticism or support ( ). Saliency at time t is rescaled to proportions by the weighted total number of criticism and support statements issued by this party.
Eq. (3), saliency of criticism news:
is the m × m matrix of support and criticism among parties at day t (range -1..+1).
An entry in matrix refers to the value of criticism or support of party i for party j on a given day t (current day: t = 0) calculated from the number of news items reporting support or criticism ( ) and the value of each support statement/criticism ( , range -1..+1, negative for criticism, positive for support). 
Hypotheses to explain the adjustment of a party's issue position
As noted before, the model predicts the value of party i's position on issue k as reflected in the media on day t. A lagged version of the dependent variable is used to model a party's tendency to stick to its previous issue positions. If political parties stick to their issue positions, as commonly assumed in campaigning research, then the dependent variable would be identical to its lagged version. In network analysis, autoregression is also known as the inertia or conformity effect. In autoregression models, a time lag must be selected; how much time is needed for a party to change its issue position fundamentally if it would like to do so? In political campaigning, a two-week period seems to be reasonable. In the first week, other parties and internal deliberations cause fuzz, then one weekend is needed for internal party consultations, finally, another week is required in which the new policy is implemented in new statements, interviews, press releases, and so on. A period of two weeks is the medium term in our model. Ideological tit-for-tat or ideological reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984) represents the maxims: If you attack me, I will attack your salient issue positions; If you support me, I will adapt to your issue positions. Not responding negatively towards attacks will be considered as dovish and soft in a political environment, whereas not responding positively towards support will be considered as cynical (always being destructive towards everybody comes down to the ALLD-strategy (Axelrod, 1984) ). Not responding in accordance with the prescriptions of indirect tit-for-tat in a game that allows for it will harm the reputation and status of the players involved (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) .
Partisan transitivity and ideological tit-for-tat predictors are calculated using the values of issue positions (matrix ) weighted by their saliency (matrix ) and similar information on the one-mode network of support/criticism among political parties weighted (element-wise multiplication) by their saliency ( ). In the formulas below, element-wise multiplication is represented by the ⨂ symbol. matrix multiplication is implied if this symbol is absent. Element-wise division is represented by a division line.
Partisan transitivity and ideological tit-for-tat are calculated as a matrix multiplication of matrix with matrix and its transpose respectively, in which the elements of the two matrices are element-wise weighted with the corresponding weight matrices and .
Eq. (5), Partisan transitivity:
The third network context covariate is exclusively based on the two-mode network of issue positions. It measures whether parties adapt their issue position to the position of the parties with which they agree on most other issues or, conversely, take an opposite position from parties with which they disagree on most other issues. We label this tendency "Ideological realignment" because a party abandons its former idiosyncratic positions on specific issues so as to give voters the impression that they largely align with some of the other parties on almost every issue, and disagree with the remaining parties on almost every remaining issue. One may infer a matrix similar to � ⨂ �′ in equations 
Method
Having stated the model, we now turn to the empirical case study. This section describes the data, the data analysis setup, and the stochastic statistical method for multivariate analysis used to test the hypotheses.
Data
The data pertain to the 2006 parliamentary election campaign in the Netherlands. The
Netherlands has a multi-party system with an electoral threshold of only 0.67% of the votes to obtain a seat in Parliament (150 seats). We consider the media coverage of the ten parties that obtained seats in Parliament after the elections: CDA (Christian-Democrats), Protocol sentences were extracted from headlines and leads in newspaper articles and anchorman statements in television news according to a semantic network analysis method for manual content analysis (Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder, & Rietberg, 1997) . Two types of protocol sentences, each with a subject/predicate/object-template are relevant to this study: statements about issue positions with a "party / issue position / issue"-template and statements about support or criticisms from one party on another party with a "party / criticism or support / party"-template. Issue positions were coded on a pro-con scale ranging from -1..+1. Criticism and support statements were also coded on a -1..+1-scale.
The news from the last three months before the elections was analyzed (Kleinnijenhuis, Scholten, et al., 2007) 
Towards a stochastic model
The specification of the stochastic longitudinal network model should account for network dependencies and for dependencies in time. Dependencies in time arise from a tendency of parties to stick to their old issue positions (hypothesis H1) and from remembrance of the past in the construction of network covariates ( hypotheses H2, H3, and H4). Time dependencies can be modeled by means of autoregression or inertia parameters.
Network dependencies refer to a lack of independence among observations within the rows (parties) and within the columns (issues) of the network. For this reason, a straightforward linear regression model does not suffice. For one-mode networks MRQAP-regression has been proposed to arrive at plausible estimates of overall regression parameters and their standard errors (Dekker, Krackhardt, & Snijders, 2007 ), but we model the dependence of the observations on specific parties and issues explicitly by means of a cross-nested multilevel model. Parties and issues are said to be "completely crossed", since every instance of a party occurs at least once with each instance of an issue and vice versa. Therefore we will use a statistical package suitable of estimating parameters in a cross-nested General Linear (Mixed) Model, i.e. the R-package lme4 (Bates, 2010a (Bates, , 2010b 
Results

Description of the variables
The dependent variable is the issue position of a party with respect to an issue on a given day, so we first present an overview of the issue positions of the parties during the last 10 weeks of the campaign. Table 1 shows the parties (left-wing to right-wing arranged from left to right) and issues (sorted top-down from issues supported by left-wing parties to issues supported mainly by right-wing parties), with average issue position in the cells.
Overall, issue positions are more often pro than con (the overall average is .31). There are marked differences among parties with respect to the pro versus con positions as well as among issues. Effects of these random factors are to be expected in the multilevel model.
Perhaps most interesting are the standard deviations of the issue positions of parties. If a standard deviation is zero, a party has maintained the same issue position during the last 10 weeks of the election campaign, which includes having no standpoint. This is the case only in a minority of party by issue combinations, which indicates that during the campaign the parties either exhibit some random variation in their issue positions or they adjust their issue positions systematically. Some parties are much more persistent in their issue positions, notably some new parties PvdD (zero variation on 7 issues) and the PVV (no variation on 6 issues), as well as the older small party CU (no variation on 6 issues).
All three large parties (PvdA, CDA, and VVD) change their positions on all issues during the last 10 weeks of the campaign. The issue positions of parties approximate a normal distribution, except for three peaks.
Parties often simply state that they are against (-1), indifferent (0) or pro (+1) a specific instantiation or subissue of an issue. The distribution of the predictors is more or less normal with little peaks at the extremes only for the ideological tit-for-tat variable.
The predictors correlate positively with the dependent variable, especially the autoregression term (r = .71) and ideological realignment (r = .54) ( Table 3 shows the results of the network autoregression model with cross-nested random effects (Model 3), preceded by two bottom-line tests of the autoregression model without network effects and without cross-nested random effects (Model 1), and of a network autoregression model without cross-nested random effects (Model 2). A look at the goodness-of-fit criteria (e.g. -2 LogLikelihood) at the bottom the table shows that the full model does a better job than the network autoregression model, which does not allow for variations between different parties and different issues, which in turn does a better job than a bare autoregression model. The explained variance R 2 , which is not the best but the easiest to interpret measure of Goodness-of-Fit, amounts to 50% (0.499) for the autoregression model, 60% (0.600) for the network autoregression model, and 70% (0.699) for the network autoregression model with cross-nested random effects. The relatively low explained variance of 50% for the autoregression model Further standardization on the basis of sample standard deviations would be tricky (Gelman & Hill, 2007) .
Results
Partisan transitivity does no longer show significant effects at the aggregate level when cross-nested random effects are included, which means that generally speaking parties will not take over issue positions from another party simply because that party was supported recently. More likely the party will withdraw its support in case of unexpected issue positions of befriended parties but the dynamics of the one-mode network are beyond the scope of this paper. The random effects, however, suggest that the partisan transitivity effect holds for some parties and some issues.
Ideological tit-for-tat applies more generally, which means that parties do play an ideological tit-for-tat game. A party will respond to attacks from another party with issue positions that contradict the issue position of the attacking party. To put it differently, parties will "rationalize" attacks from others, which is a sensible strategy, since media effects research shows that attacks from other parties can be turned into an electoral advantage if "owned issues" can be put on the media agenda in turn .
Ideological realignment shows the strongest effects across the board, which means that parties give up specific issue positions that are not shared by their ideological friends, whereas they will accentuate issue positions that are shared by their ideological friends or opposed by their ideological adversaries. This result shows that statements on issue positions in the media are consequential to the issue positions that other parties broadcast through the media. Thus, the discussion of political issues triggers its own development. they agreed on most issues, or the disagreement with parties with whom they disagreed on most issues.
SP and GL, the ideologically more extreme but fairly large parties to the left of the PvdA, relied especially on ideological tit-for-tat (0.71 and 0.33 respectively). Direct attacks on them, for example attacks on their competence to rule the nation, were reciprocated with issue positions that contradicted the issue positions of the parties attacking them. SP and PVV, the most extreme parties to the left and the right of the Dutch political landscape, relied also somewhat on partisan transitivity (0.26 and 0.27 respectively). Once they attacked a party, they would also consistently attack the issue positions of that party.
With the wisdom of hindsight one may conclude that the centre leftist PvdA and the centre rightist VVD, who relied almost exclusively on ideological realignment, lost the elections, presumably because they did not have an appropriate answer against the partisan transitivity strategy and the ideological tit-for-tat strategy of more extreme parties to the left and the right of them.
We now highlight the issues that were addressed with a specific strategy. Dutch politicians were especially stable in their statements on crime fight (0.66) but very unstable when it came to rightist issues, i.e. to precise tax reliefs and precise cuts in government expenditures (0.15). The issues that rank high on the ideological realignment strategy define the traditional left-right axis in Dutch politics, ranging from rightist issues (2.13), infrastructure (e.g. more roads, less traffic jams), crime fight (1.62), and immigrants (1.68) to leftist issues and health care. Positions concerning specific left or right-wing issues were realigned with each other, so as to give a clear picture to the voters of the major divisions between the parties in the Dutch party landscape. To a much lesser degree realignment took place for issues that define unique parties, such as Christian norms and values (CDA, CU and SGP, 0.77 only), the environment (GL and PvdD, 0.82), and democratization (D66 and GL, 0.65). Ideological tit-for-tat is strongest for leftist issues (0.36), which means that attacks on a party were often reciprocated with statements about (the waste of money for) social security. Partisan transitivity, however, was strongest for rightist issues (0.57), which means that once a party decided to attack or to support another party, it usually also attacked or supported that party's issue position with respect to rightist issues.
Thus, rightist issues such as lower taxes and cuts in government expenditures play a pivotal role in Dutch campaign politics. Parties are extremely unstable in their precise issue position but they realign their position in agreement with their overall (dis)agreement on issues with other parties. If they attack other parties, they also attack their issue position with regard to rightist issues. This is in line with advocacy coalitions theory, which predicts that actors adapt their beliefs to their allies. To sum up, the estimated cross-nested random effects displayed in Table 4 provide remarkably fresh insights into the campaign strategies used in the Dutch electoral campaigning to adjust issue positions on a daily basis.
Discussion
An actor-based model for network dynamics (Snijders, et al., 2010) with the parties with whom they agree across the range of all issues (H4, ideological realignment). The predictions that follow from these hypotheses contradict the prevailing consensus in the comparative political science literature (Budge, et al., 2001; Kriesi, et al., 2006 ) that parties stick to their issue positions in a given campaign (H1, autoregression or inertia).
The two-mode network autoregression model with cross-nested random effects that we used to test the hypotheses, assumes that during an election campaign parties decide The network autoregression model with cross-nested random factors applied in the current research deviates from the assumptions often used in longitudinal network research, for example in SIENA (Snijders, et al., 2010) . The model used here assumes interval measures of ties in the one-mode and two-mode networks rather than binary
measurements. An information environment is assumed that can be estimated on the basis of a content analysis of the daily news, which results in far more time points than in panel network studies. In addition to data on relationships (i.c., criticism or support) and behaviors (i.c., issue positions), our model uses data on the saliency of these relationships and behaviors. The heavy data requirements seem to limit the usefulness of the model.
However, due to the availability of browsers and social media on the internet and recent advances in web mining, content analysis software, and text mining algorithms for syntactic parsing and sentiment analysis, gathering the data that meet the requirements of the model will become more easy . Variants of the modeling approach developed in this article can be applied not only to other election campaigns, but also to a variety of different research areas in business, politics, and social life, where actors interact with each other, while building up their own preferences and behaviors.
